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Introduction
Minimum wages (MWs) have been for a long time and continue to be brought up as a panacea in discussions about labor market policy, equality and fairness. MWs are implemented in developed and developing countries alike. The institutional designs range from a nation-wide MW to regional and sector-specific rates. Some countries rely on different levels of pay for younger and older or more and less educated employees. Such great variety of institutional details reveals the manifold opinions and beliefs in societies and governments across the world about the effects of the MW.
Germany introduced its first MW only in 1997 as a sector-specific MW in parts of the construction industry. The MW covered blue-collar workers ("gewerbliche Despite its seminal importance it has been little evaluated. This can be blamed mainly on the lack of suitable data. König and Möller (2007) find small positive effects of the MW introduction on wages and negatively (slightly positively) employment effects in East (West) Germany using data from the Federal Employment Agency that do not allow for calculation of hourly wages and a proper distinction of those treated. The results on employment are challenged by Müller (2010) who finds negative employment effects, particularly large for East Germany.
Evidence on wage effects of the MW from the UK reports a significant increase in wages and a compression of the lower part of the wage distribution (Machin and Wilson, 2004; Machin et al., 2003; Dickens and Manning, 2004b) . Studies for the US emphasize the role of spillovers and effects of the MW on parts of the wage distribution where it is not binding (Katz and Krueger, 1992; Card and Krueger, 1995; Manning, 2003) . The institutional design of the German MW is closely tied to the wage bargain on the sectoral level in contrast to many other countries' institutions and the MW was introduced as an additional lowest rung to the pay scale in the wage bargain. For the Spanish setting which is somewhat more akin to the German case Dolado et al. (1997) attribute a 6.21% wage gain to the existence of collectively bargained sectoral MWs situated above the national statutory minimum. While the general effect of unions and/or collective agreements on wages has not been conclusively settled yet for the German case (Stephan and Gerlach, 2005; Fitzenberger et al., 2008) it remains an open question how the introduction of a lowest wage floor determined in the wage bargain that is binding for all workers in an industry affects average wages and the structure of wages overall.
The aim of this study is to shed light on the following issues: Did the MW truly bite? Was there an average effect on wage growth and was such effect heterogeneous across wage regimes? Are there spillover effects of the MW?
Owing to the initial introduction of the MW to certain sub-sectors of the industry these questions can be evaluated in the scope of a natural experiment. One of the few data sources in Germany that allow for calculation of hourly wages while offering enough observations with industry information on the 4-digit level is the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES; "Gehalts-und Lohnstrukturerhebung"), a linked employer-employee data set. Based on two cross sections I can properly distinguish between employees that were eligible to the MW and those that were not. Due to the data structure two groups of employees in the construction sector lend themselves naturally as control groups; blue-collar workers in establishments that make part of the construction sector but are not in the treated sub-sectors and white-collar workers in the industry. Based on a "differences-in-differences-indifferences" (DDD) estimation strategy these two groups are used as a means to back out the treatment effect of the MW on gross hourly wages. Moreover the impact heterogeneity along the wage distribution is analyzed with unconditional quantile regressions as proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) 
I find a surprisingly large positive mean effect of the MW on wages in the treated sub-sectors of East Germany. Average wages grew by 8% due to the policy. Coefficients estimated for West Germany are small and insignificant. The impact is not homogeneous; while the wage growth for East German blue-collar workers under individual contracting is highly significant, the effect for those under the sectoral collective agreement (CA) is not significantly different from zero. Along the wage distribution the treatment effect for those under individual bargaining in East Germany is highest in the lowest quartile but treatment at higher percentiles remains positive and significant albeit of smaller size. In West Germany the insignificant mean effect for wages under collective contracts is complemented by a clearly positive and significant treatment effect in the middle and upper part of the distribution.
This study is a first step in evaluating the impact of sectoral MWs that are set in the scope of the wage bargain. The evidence suggests that the institutional setting at hand is a lot more conducive to spillovers and hence larger wage effects of the MW than under statutory MWs. It also underlines that a MW introduction may affect wage dispersion and may increase wages that were not the initial target of the MW policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews theoretical and empirical literature on the topic while Section 3 summarizes the state of the German construction sector at the time of the MW introduction and its institutional design. In Section 4 details on the data source are presented, sample selection and group assignment are discussed and descriptive statistics provided.
Section 5 illustrates the estimation strategies whose results are presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Previous Literature
Although MWs remain one of the most studied fields in economics the evidence does not argue conclusively in favor of one of the two sides of the political debate.
Theory has derived antagonistic results with regard to employment effects depending on assumptions. Assuming compliance the effect on wages that were below the MW before its introduction clearly has to be positive.
Economists have developed theoretical models that explain effects of the MW on wages higher up in the wage distribution (see Neumark and Wascher (2008) for a concise overview also on empirical evidence). If firms substitute low qualified employees with better qualified employees to even up wages and worker productivity wages of the later increase according to Pettengill (1981) . These spillover effects decrease along the distribution. A competing explanation is presented by Manning (2003) ; in the framework of an equilibrium search model with monopsonistic firms employers that pay generous wages to hire workers matched with low-wage firms have to increase their wage offers even further after the introduction of the MW to hire enough workers. Again, this effect is strongest for firms that used to pay just a little more than the new MW. Grossman (1983) explains spill-overs of the MW with the need to maintain the wage hierarchy. More skilled workers are better paid but their effort depends on the relative distance in pay to the low-skilled workers that experience a wage hike due to the MW introduction. This gives rise to a twofold pressure on the wages of the more skilled; for one, the employers' attempt to substitute the low-skilled workers with more skilled workers shifts demand, for two, the more skilled workers would reduce their effort in view of the smaller wage differential relative to the less-skilled workers, if their own wages were not increased accordingly as well. Finally, a recent model proposed by Dittrich and Knabe (2010) implements the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution as opposed to the common Nash bargain that cannot explain spillovers of the MW. Employers and unions agree on a bargain if their relative utility gains are equalized which is defined as the ratio of the actual gain relative to the maximum feasible gain. The introduction of the MW reduces the maximum feasible gain for the employers as the best solution available now is moved up to the statutory MW. The employers' bargaining set is thus reduced which in turn leads to higher wages.
Given the questions at hand and the institutional setting of the MW in Germany three fields of the empirical literature promise some useful insights to take away with:
(1) the vast literature on MWs, particularly its effects on wages and spillovers, (2) the literature on the effect of the wage minima agreed on in collective bargaining, and as a sidestep (3) the literature on the general effect of unions and CAs on wages and wage structure given the importance of the social partners in the German case.
Compared to the very large literature on employment effects of the MW a comparatively small number of studies focuses on the effect on wages. In the UK the introduction of the National MW in 1999 is used to analyze the impact on wage growth and the wage distribution; Machin and Wilson (2004) find for UK care homes that on the home level wages rose significantly with a spike a the new MW and that the lower end of the wage distribution was compressed (Machin et al., 2003) . Dickens and Manning (2004b) detect an impact of the MW at the 5% per-centile that disappears at the 10% percentile, which confirms the findings assembled by Metcalf (2004) . The overall effect on inequality is found to be small by Dickens and Manning (2004a) .
The findings of little or no spill-overs run counter to evidence found for the US.
In an early study Grossman (1983) finds that wages for occupations just above the MW see an increase at least in the short run as a response to a MW hike. Studies by DiNardo et al. (1996) ; Lee (1999); Teulings (2000) also oppose the view that the MW has little or no effect on the wage distribution. Manning (2003) follows Lee (1999) and finds based on CPS data that for wages just above the MW spillovers amount up to 11% of the MW yet the effect dies out at wages 50% higher than the MW. Katz and Krueger (1992) and Card and Krueger (1995) analyze spillovers of the MW in fast food restaurants in Texas; 16% of firms increase wages by more than the MW hike actually forced them to and a large fraction actually maintained the wage hierarchy. Amongst companies with a starting wage 5.88% higher than the newly introduced MW 60% increased wages.
For Germany König and Möller (2007) studied the impact of the MW in the construction sector on employment and wage growth in the familiar "difference-indifferences" (DD) framework with data from the Federal Employment Office. They found a positive and significant effect on wage growth due to the MW introduction for both parts of the country ranging from 1% to 3% in East Germany and 0.5% in West Germany. The control group is designed as employees situated slightly higher up in the wage distribution and no statement beyond the mean effect can be made.
If there were any spillover effects of the MW, wage growth would be underestimated by construction of control group. Employment effects turn out negative (slightly positive) in East (West) Germany. Particularly the results for West Germany were hotly debated amongst economists and in the media (Storbeck, 2007; Kluve and Schmidt, 2007; Meier and Munz, 2008) in view of the choice of control group and data restrictions, i.e. the determination of treatment and control group without information on hourly wages. Müller (2010) uses semi-parametric estimation methods to gauge the employment effect based on the GSES for 2001. He finds small negative effects for West Germany (1-2%) and significant employment losses in East Germany (4-5%).
Given the important role played by the social partners in setting the MW a closer look at the effect of union membership and more particularly collective bargaining on wages is helpful. For the US there is a vast literature on the effect of union membership (see Blau and Kahn (1999) for an overview, Card and Krueger (1995) , Firpo et al. (2009) inter alia). A field less studied is the role of wage minima set in the scope of collective bargaining schemes. Dolado et al. (1997) analyze the case of Spain where collectively bargained minima covered about 85% of wage earners at that time and were much more binding than the statutory national minimum. They find that the collectively bargained wages significantly reduced wage dispersion and observe wage gains between 6.21% (overall) and 12.32% (semi-skilled workers) at the cost of non-negligible employment loss.
Studies on the effects of union membership in Germany in earlier years find mixed evidence; Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991) amongst others find no direct effect of individual union membership on earnings for Germany, Wagner (1991) finds a positive wage premium when restricting his analysis to blue-collar workers. Yet union density has always been a lot lower than coverage by collective agreements in Germany. In the year 2000, e.g., trade union density was only at 25% in 2000 in the overall economy, but 68% of employees were covered by collective wage bargaining (OECD, 2004, p. 145) . This mirrors the fact that if an employer makes part of the employers' association and only one of his employees is in the union, the tariff is extended to all his employees (for greater detail see Haucap et al. (2006, p. 363) ).
Reliable information of union density on a sectoral level is unfortunately not available; anecdotal evidence suggests that deunionization did not spare the construction sector despite the traditionally strong presence of unions in the sector. Particularly in East Germany firms left the employers' association. Given the German institutional setting it is generally agreed that the debate should not so much center on the union wage premium but more on whether there is a (potentially additional) premium to coverage by a collective contract.
Based on the linked employer-employee data set of the GSES Stephan and Gerlach (2005) find that the expected wage of the average worker is higher in establishments under a collective contract than in the uncovered regime for full-time employees in large manufacturing firms (100 or more employees) in Lower-Saxony.
In another study by the authors (Gerlach and Stephan, 2006) 3 The German Construction Sector and the MW Up till the 1990s the German construction sector was compared to other countries highly unionized and had developed a corporatist system that ensured a comparatively high and stable pay for German workers (Eichhorst, 2005) . In the following years the German construction sector was stricken by the aftermath of the reunification boom and the dawn of the European unification. Earlier the number of posted workers from non-European countries had exceeded those from European countries.
But the free movement of labor associated with the Single European Market had brought ever more posted workers from EU countries. Although the number of posted workers from non-EU countries that came to Germany based on bilateral contracts had continually decreased throughout those years labor market tightness continued to increase. With the abolishment of seasonal employment in 1993 policy makers had de facto exhausted the tool kit of then available protectionist policies. German legislation pre-empted the lengthy EU-level negotiations and passed its own bill. Later on only slight modifications of the German Posted Workers Act ("Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz") were needed to comply with the final EU directive in 1996. For the Posted Workers Act to become effective the rate of the MW had to be determined in the scope of a CA and declared generally binding via the extension rule ("Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserklärung"). These three interacting pieces of legislation are discussed in detail below.
The CA on the MW is bargained by the organization(s) of the employers and the unions within the general negotiations between the social partners on contracts for their members in an area tariff system. Negotiations typically revolve around the tariff for the basic wage which refers to employees with relevant 3-year vocational training and some kind of further specialization or a few years of work experience.
In the main construction trade the geographic differentiation of pay rates refers to East and West Germany. In the wage bargain exemption clauses can be agreed on that allow deviating alas lower wages or higher working hours if the employer faces hard times. For the main construction trade exemption clauses included wage cuts of up to 10% (5%) in East Germany (West Germany) while not underbidding the MW. Some employers also opt to pay above the general pay scale. CAs refer to the establishment level as opposed to the judicial entity of the firm.
In the main construction trade different agreements on pay scales are negotiated for blue-collar and white-collar workers. Employees fulfilling typical construction tasks are classified as blue-collar workers with the exception of head masons who make part of the white-collar work force.
2 As the highest ranking group involved in construction task they are situated between their blue-collar colleagues fulfilling construction task and white-collar construction engineers. The pay scale for bluecollar workers was composed of more than eight different job grades at the time.
The extension rule declares the CA compulsory for all employers and blue-collar employees in the sector regardless of whether they are member of the collective bargaining parties or not. For the extension rule to be applicable the CA has to fulfill two requirements; for one it has to be passed in accordance with the law that regulates the collective wage bargaining process ("Tarifvertragsgesetz"). Moreover organized establishments have to employ at least 50% of the concerned employees and the extension rule has to be of "substantial public interest".
The extension rule has to be passed by the committee of collective bargaining parties ("Tarifausschus") that is made up of employee and employer representatives in equal measure before the Ministry of Labor can apply the extension rule. Along the way it opened the loophole for setting a MW for all German employees in the sector.
The construction industry consists of several sub-sectors. In the official micro data an establishment is assigned to the sub-sector where it generates the major part of its value-added. To switch sectors an establishment has to shift the greatest part of its economic activity. 4 The social partners are grouped along the lines of certain sub-sectors or groups of sub-sectors. Great parts of the main construction trade are represented by two employers' organization ("Zentralverband Deutsches
Baugewerbe" and "Hauptverband der deutschen Bauindustrie") and one union ("Industriegewerkschaft Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt").
Sub-sectors other than the main construction trade have traditionally their own structures and negotiate their own CAs. Electric installation, roofing, painting, and wreckage in construction introduced sooner or later their own MWs. Therefore a sizable part of employees in the construction sector became eligible later and/or at a
Most of those rely on the law for minimum working standards and are not negotiated by the social partners directly. 4 Employers could have tried to escape MW coverage by shifting the major part of their economic activity to a non-covered sub-sector while generating a marginally smaller fraction of value-added in economic activity typical of the covered sector. The combination of occupations, thus the skill input by workers did neither change greatly in the covered nor in the non-covered part of the construction industry; this indicates that dodging the MW legislation by switching industry affiliation is not an issue. Given the subsequent introduction of MW in neighboring sub-sectors such behavior would have been quite short-sighted anyways. different MW rate than the majority of 4-digit-level sectors in the main construction trade in January 1997. The MW introduction had been delayed by approximately 12 months owing to the rejection of the policy from the employers' side and ongoing disaccord within the different bodies involved. The employers' organizations in the main construction trade were not generally opposed to the introduction of a MW. But the umbrella organization of employers was strictly opposed and halted the introduction. As a compromise with regard to employers' opposition to its introduction, the MW was to be reduced after its first phase when it finally came into effect.
5
The MW is an hourly and establishment based concept that is thus differentiated with regard to its validity in terms of sectors covered and employees covered. On the employee level only blue-collar workers above 18 and not on vocational training are eligible, regardless of their tasks and level of education. A few professions are explicitly excluded (i.e. kitchen aids, security guards, delivery and cleaning personnel). With the introduction of the MW a new wage group was created in the pay scale of the CAs.
6 It was agreed that this group should be situated below the till then lowest paid group of unskilled laborers in non-construction occupations. 1997 /1998 , 1998 /1999 , 1999 /2000 and 2001 /2002 In West Germany the MW finally set came equal to 90.55% of what the lowest wage group had earned at the time the MW came into effect. In East Germany this difference was marginally smaller with 8.34 percentage points distance. Social partners set the level of the MW without any formal knowledge of their competitors' wage structure. At the time of the MW negotiations no data base with reliable hourly wage information differentiated along wage regime was available. Table 1 shows the path of the MW from its introduction in January 1997 up till August 2002. The nominal MW increased by 7.86% (12,77%) in East (West) Germany during this time.
Data, Differentiation of Treatment and Control
Groups & Descriptive Evidence
The GSES
This study is based on official micro data from the GSES, the German salary and wage survey (Hafner and Lenz, 2007) . 
Treatment and Control Groups
The sectoral MW was passed on a national scale and differentiated in its level with regard to East and West Germany. For that reason geographical variation cannot be used to construct treatment and control group as is commonly done in the literature. Yet I exploit the fact that not all workers in the construction industry became eligible. Two subgroups within the industry lend themselves readily as control groups; blue-collar workers from other sub-sectors in construction and whitecollar workers. As explained in more detail in Section 5 I use these two control groups together to back out the treatment effect that goes beyond general time, (sub)industry, and worker type effects. Table 2 Another source of differentiation within the construction industry is the distinc- tion between blue-and white-collar workers. MW legislation covers exclusively bluecollar workers in treatment sectors. As the data set is a linked employer-employee data set one observes wages for blue-and white-collar workers that are employed at exactly the same establishments. In view of general shocks affecting an establishment white-collar workers thus constitute another natural comparison group for their blue-collar colleagues. A rough comparison of quantiles of nominal hourly wages for eligible blue-collar workers before and after the policy is provided in Table 4 . The first two rows
Descriptive Evidence
show that percentiles on the tails of the wage distribution grew in East Germany.
9 The size of theoretical wage growth needed for compliance hinges on the assumptions about wage inflation between October 1995 and January 1997. Assuming the general hourly wage inflation for the entire economy should constitute a lower bound given the unfavorable developments in the construction sector compared to the economy as a whole. As an upper bound the theoretical wage growth under compliance with no inflation adjustment is provided.
The median nominal wage barely grew, yet the 80%th wage percentile increased by 3.8%. What stands out most is the growth of the 10%-percentile; it increased by 11.33%. Considering only the wage distribution of blue-collar workers under individual contracts reveals that the distance to the median in that group more than halved over time. For West Germany the picture looks different. The small change in the left tail of the distribution increases along the percentiles and amounts to around 8% in the right tail. The picture is again heterogeneous across pay regimes; the median wage for employees under collective contract increased by nearly the double amount compared to the median of their colleagues not covered by a CA.
The MW introduced to parts of the German construction sector cannot be compared directly with other countries' experiences due to its deviating institutional design. Yet, drawing on the literature of wages effects from other countries discussed in Section 2, the set-up of the MW in the construction sector, and the descriptive evidence presented so far different scenarios come to mind about the potential effects of the MW. As it is unlikely that the higher labor costs were passed on into prices given the price pressure in the industry at the time (also see Lemos (2008) for a review of studies on the effects of MW on prices) and the scope for automatization limits the substitution of labor with capital in the sector, the major impact of the MW introduction should be detectable in the labor market.
Wages in the lower end of the distribution have to increase provided that the MW was set at a level high enough to cover some part of the work force in the sector and that there is compliance. On average one expects this effect to be large in East Germany, but less so in West Germany where the descriptive evidence reported above suggests that only a small wage hike was necessary to reach compliance.
Theoretically employers could try to cover up the extra cost incurred in the lower end of the wage distribution by decreasing wages for those earning better than the MW but given wage rigidities this seems highly unlikely particularly for those employees under a collective contract.
Several explanations offer themselves for spillover effects of the MW. The wage hierarchy argument may come in two guises; for establishments with individual bargaining the MW could exert pressure on wages for those above the MW as illustrated in Section 2. This would entail a spillover effect that is biggest on the lowest tail of the distribution before it slowly dies out along the distribution. In the institutional scheme of the MW unions and organized employers are pivotal in setting the MW rate as an additional lowest tariff in the pay scheme. If the social partners consider MWs as too high compared to the tasks fulfilled and the wage received by the other tariffs in the pay scale, namely in view of the basic wage rate, spillovers to skilled workers' wages will occur in order to maintain the wage hierarchy. The impact of the MW should then also be detectable in the upper part of the wage distribution. This again may exert additional pressure on wages for skilled workers not under CA. Given that there is a collective wage bargaining premium and unions strive to maintain it, they moreover may root for a shift of the pay scale by the amount the original premium is decreased due to the introduction of the MW and the subsequent wage increase for the non-covered employees.
Altogether mean effects of the MW on wages should be most pronounced for blue-collar workers that are not paid according to the CA, potentially also with spillovers, in East Germany where the MW is a lot more binding than in West 
Methodology

Difference-in-Differences-in-Differences Estimation
The construction sector went through troubled times in the 90s. The industry contracted as a whole while anecdotal and descriptive evidence suggest further that some sub-industries and establishments were hit harder than others by the downturn. In order to not confound the effects of the policy with general time, industry and worker type effects the two control groups defined in Section 4.2 are used to separate out the treatment effect. In the familiar DD framework the common trend assumption must not be violated. Given the unequal pressure on the labor market of construction industry's sub-sectors described above it is implausible to hold up the assumption that in the absence of the policy wages of blue-collar workers in the treated and the control sectors would have experienced the same time trend.
White-collar workers in the treated sectors make a doubtable control group as well in view of comparable time trends for blue-and white collar workers in the medium run perspective.
The DDD framework holds the advantage that its identifying assumption is considerably less restrictive. In this particular case it requires that in the absence of the policy the difference in time trends of wages for blue-and white-collar workers in the treated sectors would have been the same as the difference in time trends of wages of blue-and white-collar workers in the control sectors. The DDD framework thus allows for a differential overall trend in control and treatment sectors as much as for a differential time trend in blue-and white-collar workers' wages. While spillover effects on the control groups cannot be ruled out categorically descriptive evidence shows no significant change in the composition of occupations employed in the treated and the control sectors, and wage bargaining occurs separately across industries. The employees that appear the most susceptible of spillover effects in the control group are head masons and foremen; they are classified as white-collar workers in the wage bargain and the data yet their tasks are closest to those of the eligible workers. As a robustness check this group of employees is excluded from the baseline estimation and results do barely change (see Appendix).
Let the DDD estimator be defined as: log(wage gm ) = β 0 + β 1 * blue gm + β 2 * post g + β 3 * sector g + β 4 * (blue gm * post g ) + β 5 * (blue gm * sector g ) + β 6 * (post g * sector g ) + β 7 * (blue gm * post g * sector g )
where establishments are indexed by g = 1, ..., G. Blue-and white-collar employees 1 through M g work for establishment g. log(wage gm ) is thus the log gross hourly wage for individual m working at establishment g. e g is a K × 1 vector of establishment specific covariates and p gm is a L × 1 vector capturing explanatory variables that vary within and across establishments, thus for each individual. blue gm is a dummy variable equal to one if the observed individual is a blue-collar worker; post g 
Unconditional Quantile Regression
The DD(D) methodology allows for identification of the mean treatment effect of a policy. In the public debate the MW was presented as a means to better support those employees receiving the worst pay. The target group of the policy are thus the lower ranks of the wage distribution. If this promise of policy makers had come true, one should be able to identify higher effects at the lower quantiles of the wage distribution and lower, possibly zero or even negative effects in the higher ranks of the wage distribution. In contrast to conventional OLS, quantile regression (QR) models as first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) allow to capture such heterogeneous effects across the wage distribution.
Often covariates other than the industry dummy change along the wage distribution, e.g. observations in the lower tail of the wage distribution are typically less educated and younger. Conditional QR estimates describe how the wage is affected at a particular quantile given the explanatory variables. A drawback of the traditional quantile regression approach is its limited scope for interpretation.
Unlike conditional means in a least-squares regression do conditional QR estimates not average up to the unconditional mean. We can thus interpret conditional QR 
such that the the density of Y evaluated at τ th population quantile, q τ , is f Y (q τ ).
The RIF is defined as the sum of the distributional statistic of interest and its influence function which measures the influence of an individual observation on the distributional statistic. In the case of quantiles the RIF is 
For computation of RIF (Y ; q τ , F Y ) q τ and f Y ( q τ ) need to be estimated. The estimate of the τ th sample quantile is deduced by solving
The density of the Y is estimated using the kernel density estimator. In the second step RIF (Y ; q τ ) is regressed on the independent variables.
In order to analyze treatment effect heterogeneity along the wage distribution RIF regression is combined with the linear DDD model described in Section 5.1. Regressors for the RIF regression are just the same as in the least squares specification written out in equation (1).
Results
Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences Results
For all specifications additional controls such as age, gender, skill, tenure and establishment size were included. Table 5 and 6 summarize the main estimation results of the DDD specification for East and West Germany. Detailed regression output is supplied in the Appendix (Tables 8 and 9 ). Standard errors are clustered on the establishment level in all specifications to account for correlation of error terms within establishments.
The first column ("DDD") of Table 5 shows estimation results for the base specification (1). In the rest of the columns interactions of the variables blue, sector, post, blue * post, blue * sector, sector * post, and blue * post * sector with coverage by a CA were added and different sample restrictions made. Model "≤200" restricts the sample to establishments with up to 200 employees. This excludes only a few establishments yet they provide many observations. The column to the far right provides estimation results when the sample is restricted to employees whose wage contract is not part of a firm or establishment level agreement. Firm and establishment level agreements are typically found in larger firms but to smaller extent also in medium-sized companies. Notes: standard errors clustered on the establishment level in parentheses. ***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level. The dependent variable is log hourly wages. "CA" refers to collective, firm or establishment agreement. "DDD-CA" stands for least squares estimation of the differences-in-differences-in-differences specification differentiated along union status. "<200" restricts the sample to observations in establishments with up to 200 employees. "no firm CA" excludes observations from establishments with a firm or establishment level agreement. For further details and the full regression output refer to Table 9 .
Results for West Germany confirm that there was no significant mean treatment effect of the MW. This holds across the different specifications and sample restrictions. While point estimates suggest a slight positive impact none of the coefficients is significantly different from zero. The magnitude of effects is stable across specifications except for the overall point estimate (blue * post * sector+blue * post * sector * CA)
for the effect on blue-collar workers not covered by a CA in the sample restricted to establishments with 200 employees, yet also this point estimate is insignificant. The F-Tests reject that slopes (and intercept) in the interacted model are jointly zero and support caution with regard to effect heterogeneity along coverage by a CA.
The negative and significant base effect of coverage by collective contracting ("with CA") are in line albeit a little smaller than the findings by the study of Fitzenberger et al. (2008) . Compared to blue-collar workers in the treated sectors after the introduction is the penalty for individuals under CA barely detectable (-0.5%) and insignificant. Column "no foremen" of Table 9 shows that estimation results do not change when head masons and foremen that are classified as white-collar workers are excluded from the regression. Table 5 for general details and to Table 8 for full regression output.
In East Germany the mean treatment effect is clearly positive and significant.
Differentiation of the treatment effect along the wage contract regime reveals not so much different magnitudes of the treatment effect as confidence intervals for those under individual wage contracts and those under collective or firm agreements overlap. But while the treatment effects on those under the non-covered regime are highly significant in all regressions, estimates for those under CA are on the brink of significance. The base effect of coverage by a CA is large and significant with 11% in contrast to the results for West Germany. Amongst the blue-collar workers in the treated sectors wages under collective contracts were 7.3% higher than for those with individual wage contracts after the policy had been implemented. When employees contracted under firm and establishment level agreements are left out of the sample (column "no firm CA" in Table 6 ) the treatment effect is not significantly different from zero for those under collective contract. Compared to the sample restriction with regard to establishment size (column "≤200") a lot less observations are left out of the estimation but these observations stem from only a few establishments underlining the particular dimension of firm/establishment specific agreements.
The MW introduction led to an average wage growth of 8% for all entitled bluecollar workers in East Germany. Further differentiating by wage bargain regime reveals a surprisingly high positive effect of 13% on wages of those under individual contract which is close to the calculated theoretical wage increase needed for those observations prior to the introduction below the MW. Regressions for the effect on monthly earnings show the same patterns and magnitudes as those on hourly wages for both parts of the country. Estimations on the effect of hours worked did reveal no impact of the MW policy. In a next step, the question who benefitted the most along the distribution will be addressed. For West Germany OLS regressions found no significant mean effect of the MW on wages for non-covered workers. This result is confirmed along the whole distribution by RIF regression results. The coefficients are quite small and never significantly different from zero. The mean effect for employees under CA was not significant either but RIF results show a non-homogeneous picture along the distribution. Up till the 30%-percentile coefficient estimates meander around zero and are insignificant.
Unconditional Quantile Regression Results
Between the 40%-and the 80%-percentile coefficients take a leap in magnitude and significance: estimates range between 5.4% and 10.1%, are highly significant. The MW thus had a sizable positive impact on the upper part of the wage distribution for wage contracts under CA and wage dispersion increased. The pattern of coefficients and significance does not differ if observations with firm level agreements are excluded. It is also worth mentioning that the 40%-to 80%-percentiles encompass those tariffs in the pay scale that apply to blue-collar workers that have completed at least a relevant three-year vocational training. .60
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Notes: standard errors clustered on the establishment level in parentheses (3000 repetitions). Results from RIF regressions along the quantiles of the distribution of log hourly wages of the differences-in-differences-in-differences specification. "CA" refers to collective, firm or establishment agreement. For details on the specifications and full estimation output at selected quantiles refer to Table 10 .
The treatment effect for blue-collar workers under individual contracts in East
Germany is positive along the whole distribution. It is highest between the 5%-and the 25%-percentile and remains quite stable for the higher quantiles. 
Conclusion
This study analyzes the impact of the introduction of the first sectoral MW in 1997 in Germany on hourly wages and their distribution. The reform was aimed at setting a lower wage floor for blue-collar workers in the construction sector but was not implemented across all sub-sectors due to institutional peculiarities in the wage bargain. I use this as a natural experiment to differentiate between treatment and control group on the 4-digit-industry classification level. Based on two cross sections of a linked employer-employee data set, the GSES, blue-collar workers in non-treated parts of the construction industry and white-collar workers serve as control groups in the differences-in-differences-in-differences regression framework.
Unconditional quantile (RIF) regression complements estimated mean effects and gauges the impact heterogeneity along the wage distribution.
Descriptive results reveal that the MW bit strongly in East Germany and a lot less in West Germany. Estimation results confirm that on average blue-collar workers in the covered sectors in East Germany experienced a wage increase of 8% while I find no significant mean effect for West Germany. There is heterogeneity along the wage regime and along the distribution. In East Germany mean treatment effects for those under the collective area contract are insignificant. Along the distribution the impact is highest for the lower quartile of East German blue-collar workers bunching up the distribution from below while the effect decreases but does not die out over the rest of the distribution. For workers under collective area contracts the evidence hints at a location shift yet coefficients are on the margins of significance.
In West Germany the treatment effect is insignificant along the entire distribution Notes: standard errors clustered on the establishment level in parentheses. ***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level. The dependent variable is log hourly wages. The reference category for establishment size variables ("# <size≤ #") is 20 or less employees. CA refers to collective, firm or establishment agreement. "DDD-CA" stands for least squares estimation of the differences-in-differences-in-differences specification differentiated along union status. "<200" restricts the sample to observations in establishments with up to 200 employees; "no firm CA" estimates based on all observations except for those under firm or establishment level agreements; "no foremen" excludes foremen and head masons from the white-collar workers control group. Notes: standard errors clustered on the establishment level in parentheses. ***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level. The dependent variable is log hourly wages. The reference category for establishment size variables ("# <size≤ #") is 20 or less employees. CA refers to collective, firm or establishment agreement. "DDD-CA" stands for least squares estimation of the differences-in-differences-in-differences specification differentiated along union status. "<200" restricts the sample to observations in establishments with up to 200 employees; "no firm CA" estimates based on all observations except for those under firm or establishment level agreements; "no foremen" excludes foremen and head masons from the white-collar workers control group. Notes: standard errors clustered on the establishment level in parentheses (3000 repetitions). ***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level. The dependent variable is log hourly wages. The reference category for establishment size variables ("# <size≤ #") is 20 or less employees. "CA" refers to collective, firm or establishment agreement. Results from RIF regressions of the differences-in-differences specification differentiated along union status at the 25th, 50th and 75th quantile. See specification "DDD-CA" in Tables 8 & 8 for the least squares analogues. Notes: standard errors clustered on the establishment level in parentheses (3000 repetitions). ***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level. Results from RIF regressions along the quantiles of the distribution of log hourly wages of the differences-in-differences-in-differences specification differentiated along whether wage was agreed upon in some kind of a collective, firm or establishment agreement or not (DDD-CA). "CA" refers to collective, firm or establishment agreement. Refer to Table 10 for full regression output at selected quantiles.
